Is the Euro-Area Collapsing?
Over the last week, there are three significant Euro-Area activity figures that merit the market's consideration.
September's Eurozone's industrial production dropped from a previous August +1.3% to -1.9%
September's construction production dropped from a previous months -0.4% to -1.3%;
New Industrial Orders for the four largest populated economies-Germany, France, Italy and Spain all dropped significantly to -4.4%, -6.2%.-9.2% and -5.3% respectively. For the reverent, the United Kingdom NIO's dropped to -1.9%.
Well, shuttered factories are not privy only to the UK; they seem to be the prospect of industrial Europe, especially if one considers that levels of capacity utilization in manufacturing is slipping everywhere with the exception of an anomalous month in United Kingdom.
Evidently, once investors realize that the longer term confidence required to justify purchasing Eurobond securities is not justified by output figures from the region's business sector, then even if your brand name is Germany, and even if the rating agencies mark you tops, it won't help keep yields down. Germany is as susceptible to being dumped as is Italy and its next candidate France which witnessed its yields increase, and its yield gaps widen against the German counterparts. There is no Immune Boutique in this Shopping Mall. There isn't any vote of confidence for Germany; rather it signals that investor concern is becoming pandemic within the Euro-Area and no sovereign, especially a non-sovereign issuer, is immune. But the contagion on the financial front is not as great a deterrent in our opinion as the rapid weakening and dampening of economic activity within the area. Germany can certainly pull out, or welcome the unstable members' exit, but it can't deter the oncoming economic slowdown that will devastate its own regional economies.
The ECB is a lame-duck if Mr. Draghi continues to endorse without challenge its constitutional mandate. Signor Draghi deve sospendere 'Price Stability', which is a moot predicament at the moment, and with the help from two oversea friends, act to stabilize the yield curves. The New Normal advocated by financial and portfolio managers should not be higher unemployment and softer growth, it should be lower Returns on Investment. The structural adjustment required by the global economy in order to survive the extending contagion of below-quality investments is to realign investor expectations in view of de-stabilized and riskier investment scenarios.
Obviously, this goes contrary to the grain of conventional investment lore: the riskier the target, the higher the yield! Unfortunately, when available resources are numbered, and quality contaminated, there's not much choice. You buy into the mess,praying for a cure, or seek quarantined shelters. Are there any? You run to gold? Does anyone care? To SF, Yen or some other resource-constrained sovereign? Price those economies out of the market and over time, the original predicament only changed hands.
What is becoming clearer is that there are only a few viable Backstops in this Global economy, and the Classic is the United States Treasury, with a little help from a friend.
To the United States Treasuries-of course, and at most probably quasi-zeros, or cash the portfolio. If the latter is the soundest judgement of the wise and enlightened investors, then why wait for the storm; shelter yourselves now.
How will the markets end? Not with a tumble but a crumble. The EU will fall apart unless Draghi and some confreres show their stuff...change the discourse from financial narratives about controlling deficits and imposing guarantees to a discourse with fiscal narratives about job creation, stabilizing growth engines and stimulating aggregate demand. Mr. Draghi will need support from Mr. Bernanke and gang. He knows it and the United States know it.
Showing posts with label United Kingdom. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United Kingdom. Show all posts
Sunday, November 20, 2011
Sunday, August 7, 2011
US Sovereign Downgrade by S&P: Buffo!
On the evening of Friday, August 5, 2011, Standard and Poor’s, in an act of Bravura, downgraded United States Sovereign Debt rating to a AA+ from a AAA while reaffirming its A-1+ rating on US short term, notwithstanding their $2-trillion math-error! Bravura? More Buffonata! than Bravura! This move had to some extent been discounted by global markets. Suffice to note the past week’s session drops in all major bourses. Those drops may also pre-empt the impending confusion and instability that will characterize the upcoming weeks' sessions on most security markets, especially from Asian and European markets which, opening after watching the announcement, should experience a tumble, but not a crumble.
Todate, Moody’s and Fitch Rating have shown caution in this regard reserving their assessments for later.
The analysis by Mark Zandi of Moody's on fiscal sustainability, tax reform and responsible compromise demonstrates the type of level headedness that is required by Credit Rating Agencies when they approach new paradigmatic scenarios, because de facto, the current US Debt situation invites paradigmatic shifts in methodology and optics.
Sovereign Balance Sheet is not a Corporate Balance Sheet. There are overwhelming incidences of political discretion that can neither be reduced to a quantitative measure nor can they be appreciated as stand-alone components for a measurement standard. The deficit cannot be isolated from the trade-off matrices that configure the US relationship to its broader sphere of influence within the domestic and global political and economic network.
Apart from a global audience whose appetite was partially satisfied by the Washington deal, the winners of the Washington tug-of-war will be investors. The basic premise that some investors will be precluded from future purchases is unrealistic. Most institutional players have portfolio criteria that permits purchases on any security rated a AAA to peers by at least one or two of the Big Three. Flight from US Treasuries is also very unlikely because there is no other safer investment haven in the world than the United States.
On the downgrade, markets will bid up the AA+ US Treasuries; many investors will pull out of equity markets leading to their decline resulting from the failure of corporate equities to compete with rising sovereign debt. The US Dollar could appreciate for a time, as timely capital inflows into the US on purchases of US sovereigns dominate foreign exchange markets. At one point, given all things equal, markets will reach a state of equilibrium: the USD should subsequently fall into a lethargy . How far down must the Dollar fall before the J-curve comes into play is anyone’s guess. US manufacturers are no longer very competitive on global markets. Marshall-Lerner conditions may no longer prevail in an orthodox manner- what previously worked and set precedents may no longer apply to current conditions. Ultimately, a drop in the currency increases the existing deficits and dissembles interest for the de-facto guarantor of most of the world’s assets. Moreover, core expenditures cuts may dramatically affect a large number of sectorial players in energy, financials, defense, health and transportation as well as state, municipalities and para-government agencies.
By 2012, unless deemed progress is made on the deficit front, markets may be confronted by another adverse assessment of the US Debt situation that could trigger another downward spiral and so on.
When is the Big Sell-Off.
How much has already been Shorted.
What is the option to a Big Sell-Off.
As with any rational and conceivable counterfactual scenario, the market must review the effects of the day-after.
Firstly, if a AA+ still attracts investors, then the S & P Grid is substantively superfluous, because it does not deter investors, it merely panders a price peg.
Secondly, if it really considers US Sovereign Debt as relatively compromised in relation to other options (what similar options are there?), then S&P should be integrally considering a reassessment, if not a downgrade, of every major holder of US securities: reassessing the actuarial liability of every pension fund, the unit value of every mutual and the stability of every Bank in the world carrying US Treasuries especially the those of the UK, Canada and the Caribbeans, as well as the holdings of the Governments of China, Japan and Taiwan, since the integrity and liquidity of their respective financials are now compromised.
Thirdly, trading partners' current accounts may find themselves as compromised by the US deficit reduction plan as US domestic players. They, and their own nationals, may indeed have to envisage a weaker investment profile than anticipated in face of such a contagion as their own economic growth falters and begins staggering.
Finally, the effect of contagion within the American political and administrative system is even more immediate. Municipal, state and other domestic secured borrowers will not only find their investments more expensive to finance, they may actually find themselves excluded from markets. The impact of the above is extremely onerous on regions and communities attempting to recover. It is even more onerous on the American people as households will be forced to pay more for their debt. What appeared as an enterprising improvement in household wealth in the last quarters may quite rapidly deteriorate into ephemera.
There appears to be no end to the downward spiral. The downgrade weakens the Dollar, and eventually adversely skews expectations on Dollar Assets, further defeating the Dollar Stability Paradigm. Why would anyone hold Dollar assets under such conditions. It is somewhat irrational to advance a rational argument that impels an irrational decision. Theoretically, the world should dump dollars; but no coordinated action has been exercised yet. Is the premise false or are the components of the dilemma flawed. Probably a combination of both. As to the premise that the downgrade weakens the Dollar and the Stability Paradigm is weakened, there is some truth, but there is no real dilemma since there is no credible option to the dollar, except for the esoteric: Gold, and that should experience an early surge next week, or short date moves to the Swiss Franc or Yen. If one buys into the Gold Niche, then the predicament is: should we not revert back to the Gold Standard.
Perhaps, the real issue is that no one cares about the one S & P evaluation in the case of US Debt because 'safe haven' should be given more value than the nature or size of the deficit. Or perhaps, as reality sets in, investors will realize that the US will continue refinancing its interest payments at a higher cost indefinitely, and the principal is far enough out that it will not affect their immediate results, and in turn will be itself refinanced. So enough for intergenerational considerations!Circuit theory and modern monetary theory can certainly clarify the situation at hand and suggest reasonable solutions. We are de jure dealing with a perpetual money printing process.
Secondly, if it really considers US Sovereign Debt as relatively compromised in relation to other options (what similar options are there?), then S&P should be integrally considering a reassessment, if not a downgrade, of every major holder of US securities: reassessing the actuarial liability of every pension fund, the unit value of every mutual and the stability of every Bank in the world carrying US Treasuries especially the those of the UK, Canada and the Caribbeans, as well as the holdings of the Governments of China, Japan and Taiwan, since the integrity and liquidity of their respective financials are now compromised.
Thirdly, trading partners' current accounts may find themselves as compromised by the US deficit reduction plan as US domestic players. They, and their own nationals, may indeed have to envisage a weaker investment profile than anticipated in face of such a contagion as their own economic growth falters and begins staggering.
Finally, the effect of contagion within the American political and administrative system is even more immediate. Municipal, state and other domestic secured borrowers will not only find their investments more expensive to finance, they may actually find themselves excluded from markets. The impact of the above is extremely onerous on regions and communities attempting to recover. It is even more onerous on the American people as households will be forced to pay more for their debt. What appeared as an enterprising improvement in household wealth in the last quarters may quite rapidly deteriorate into ephemera.
There appears to be no end to the downward spiral. The downgrade weakens the Dollar, and eventually adversely skews expectations on Dollar Assets, further defeating the Dollar Stability Paradigm. Why would anyone hold Dollar assets under such conditions. It is somewhat irrational to advance a rational argument that impels an irrational decision. Theoretically, the world should dump dollars; but no coordinated action has been exercised yet. Is the premise false or are the components of the dilemma flawed. Probably a combination of both. As to the premise that the downgrade weakens the Dollar and the Stability Paradigm is weakened, there is some truth, but there is no real dilemma since there is no credible option to the dollar, except for the esoteric: Gold, and that should experience an early surge next week, or short date moves to the Swiss Franc or Yen. If one buys into the Gold Niche, then the predicament is: should we not revert back to the Gold Standard.
Perhaps, the real issue is that no one cares about the one S & P evaluation in the case of US Debt because 'safe haven' should be given more value than the nature or size of the deficit. Or perhaps, as reality sets in, investors will realize that the US will continue refinancing its interest payments at a higher cost indefinitely, and the principal is far enough out that it will not affect their immediate results, and in turn will be itself refinanced. So enough for intergenerational considerations!Circuit theory and modern monetary theory can certainly clarify the situation at hand and suggest reasonable solutions. We are de jure dealing with a perpetual money printing process.
As bond yields rise, equity markets sell-off, and since interested liquidity is not abundant these days, the market promotes its own volatility, prefers the selloff to being hostage to an uncertain future 12 months down the line-the US debt-limit problem will resurface in 2012. One hears the snickers of a community of free-loaders and free-riders. In the end, one witnesses a run to les paradis artificiels of gold and similar glitters. Metals follow course and a manufacturing sector that had tolerated an adverse and unexplainable peak in prices, experiences once again a surge in commodity prices, a drop in demand -the combination of which dampens their recovery. Layoffs follow. Companies close and household wealth plummets. We are in the third phase of the Great Recession, or Phase One of the Great Collapse. For workers and their families, it is inconceivable that this happen in and to the United States.
Did S&P cynically engage in a Marketing bravado of 'I was First' or 'We blew it last time, and we got hammered by the US Government-it's our turn now!!! '
If so, then it's ironic that Nemesis should be invoked in this farcical manner. Showmanship is not publicly responsible. To be sure, what the Rating Agency contends is that it is simply acting in accordance with its professional responsibility, intending Hayek and claiming unintended consequences with respect to the outcomes in performing its mission.But markets have short memory spans; they were ready to crucify S&P a few years ago for negligence; now they'll take the free ride they offer.
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