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The past two weeks have witnessed major changes in the political and financial landscape of the European Union and the Euro area. Two of the European region's most economically and politically unstable members have endorsed visions for new governments. An Italian lawmakers' consensus has accorded Mr. Mario Monti the opportunity to form a transitional government that will empower Mr. Monti to negotiate and manage Italy's financial portfolio through turbulent waters; a Greek lawmakers' consensus has accorded Mr. Lucas Papademos the opportunity to form a transitional government that will empower Mr. Papademos to negotiate and manage Greece's financial portfolio through even more turbulent waters.
In the same European theatre during this year's summer and fall, a new optic is also focusing the people and market's perspective on the political savoir-faire and competence of the region's traditional leadership. According to many, Mrs. Merkel and Messrs Sarkozy and Cameron are demonstrating a lack of courage to make things happen. The situation is simply too overwhelming for that threesome. To the boisterous three is the stage, but not History! History confirms that some leaders are made for good times and others, in the mold of Roosevelt and Churchill are made of a 'stuff' that captains the worst of storms.
Although premature and echoing the sound of fluttering feathers, we are nevertheless inspired by both Monti and Papademos, firstly because the respective country's lawmakers agreed to the appointment and secondly, because the national sentiment appears to be overall favorable. The fundamental criteria for success in bleak times is the support of the people-which, while it lasts tacitly transforms the leadership of a technocrat to leadership by charisma. The 'je ne sais quoi' that makes Monti and Papademos viable is exactly the opposite of 'je sais tres bien que' Mrs. Merkel and M. Sarkozy are no longer comfortable to lead the EU nor the Eurozone out of this maelstrom. Mrs. Merkel whose economy is cruising through the turbulence seems confused about her directions and reads signals with great difficulty, she should possibly review her entourage for more capable resources. Mr Sarkozy should leave aside his political ambitions and rise to the European Region's challenge-it would probably guarantee him the undecided electorate. Finally, Mr. Cameron should abandon his economic platform and slowly steer towards fiscal accommodation before the country reaches the crevice.The economic indicators for the UK are in a sharp decline, and although inflation is for all intents and purposes non-problematic, unemployment is on the rise and capacity is in decline. The latter do not project good times.
In this maze of political ambiguity, Monti and Papademos, seconded by a known entity Mr. Mario Draghi stand out quite remarkably. In fact, the rise of Monti may have been spurred by Mr. Draghi's reluctance to fully engage the ECB in support of the Italian auction sponsored under the last Berlusconi government. The politicization of the European Central Bank in this context is not acceptable-it mirrors the rise of a political elite beyond the legitimacy of elected representation. If the analysis of the ECB's undemocratic behavior is correct, then Mr. Draghi must explain the actions of his office towards the Italian electorate.
On the other hand, regardless of the origins of their rise, Messrs Monti and Papademos were well-trained to deal with the one concrete challenge of any political economy - to spur employment and extend economic growth. Mr. Monti, as a student of the keynesian Mr. James Tobin has the baggage and opportunity to challenge the austerity measures that are being imposed on the Italian economy. The discourse is not to settle on the terms for a refinancing but to convince markets that the conventional wisdom is not operative and will fail dramatically in the longer run. If markets do not want to be disrupted, then they must entertain the possibility that social unrest will certainly ensue a market's intransigence towards the plight of the unemployed. The matter does not involve a change in narratives, it requires a change in the essence of the discourse.
For Mr. Papademos, the measure of success lies in convincing the Greek electorate that unless there is some accommodation by the people, then there will be no accommodation by the markets. But this tradeoff is quite out-of-line with Mr. Papademos own dispositions. As a young economist, Mr. Papademos studied the accommodation of anti-inflation policy in promoting employment. If one considers that the whole segment of the public service is discontented about the market behavior towards Greece's dilemma, then Mr. Papademos must re-engage the early flirtations of his intellectual odyssey and abandon the ECB temple's aphorism of 'Price Stability'. One also hopes that he will challenge the skew towards privatization of public assets that seems to be permeating the ideological baggage of most European leaders in structuring refinancing.
Certainly, one of the critical errors of the ECB financial managers has been the concession to promote 'price stability' at the expense of employment. During two consecutive sessions in April and July, Mr. Trichet decided to boost interest rates when every economic indicator in Europe signaled that there was no inflationary threat imminent on the horizon. If anything, the rate increases intensified an already fragile economic landscape, tempering business investment, and disappointing any consumer initiative to spend. The initiatives certainly cast doubt on the sound judgement of European financial leadership. One can forgive Mr. Papademos for the latter case in point,because obviously, Mr Papademos although a former member of ECB's executive directorship, and Vice-President to Mr. Trichet, had left the ECB in 2010. What does that imply for Mr. Draghi who inherits the sequitor of that deepening crisis. On the one hand, Mr. Draghi has signaled his intentions to support any reasonable auctions in the market. If there is anything for Mr. Draghi to recall it is one of his former teacher's Robert Solow's insight that persistent levels of unemployment adversely affect long term growth in productivity and a second caution that accelerating unemployment can have a disinflationary effect which, in our opinion, given the European context of the day translates into a tendency to affect adversely real wages more than prices, hence disposable income and consumer spending rather than corporate revenues.
Although both Messrs Monti and Papademos are highly capable and well-intentioned, the leap from technocracy to polity is not a matter of degrees. It involves a qualitative leap that resembles more a Kierkegaardian leap of faith that marks the end of innocence. Although the scenario both men confront at the moment in their respective nations is reminiscent of the High-Noon sheriff's duel with destiny, both men are certainly more equipped and better supported than the solitary Gary Cooper with his lone gun.
Nevertheless, we have faith that both men will succeed by cautiously pulling back from endorsing further austerity and inviting the markets to the table in order to embed the common sense of loosening up their exigencies. We also trust that Mr. Draghi will endorse a more accommodating stance towards national governments that confront onerous economic and financial challenges. There is no easy formula for success, but there are options that are more beneficial than tightening the coffers of an economy- put people back to work.
I admire your optimism. I agree that two individuals with good credentials, spirit and experience can help. However, I wonder whether it'll be enough. There is a serious problem within the European monetary establishment. Can't they see the problem before them. Too many EZ member states have over 10 percent unemployment. Demand and orders are in sharp decline. What are they waiting for? Get the leaders of the EMU nations in a room and change the constitutional statutes/treaties of the ECB. The ECB needs to be given authority to step in and guarantee a market for European sovereign bonds. It's the only solution. Failing that, even loosening fiscal policy won't be sufficient. KC Wheare, the great theorist of federalism, once wrote that federations require at least two elements to function properly: a constitution and the rule of law. The EU proves that a central bank that stands ready to purchase the debt of member nations is another requirement. Also, a federal fiscal authority would be an optimal addition.
ReplyDeleteThank you very much for your insightful comment, Circuit. I agree that it would be ideal for the ECB to be a sovereign currency printer. Unfortunately, as you imply, it has neither the constitutional authority nor the legislative mandate at the moment to exercise this initiative. That you conceive that possibility is commendable, however, I would concur with your JH Craw and swells that the proposal is very unlikely to succeed without radically Germany transforming its mind-set.
ReplyDeleteI also took note of your comment to JHCraw and swells in the your own excellent posting In Fictional Reserve Barking:
http://fictionalbarking.blogspot.com/2011/11/inflation-targeting-still-bocs-top.html#comment-form
dated November 18, 2011, 23:51.
Again I concur that the political concept cannot succeed without an underlying economic institution that guarantees the European Union’s debt as well as the debt of its membership. However, I think some sovereign members have succeeded too well under the status quo that they may even be willing to forfeit the advantage of sticking around to support the troubled membership.
You are correct, Circuit (nod) that the real moral hazard is letting the crisis continue, but that does not change the perception of those that may actually be permeating the crisis through their own stubbornness to attend to the financial shortcomings of the Union.